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Allen Dulles' final public speech as Eisenhower's DCI (and a speech which was to become, also, the final speech of his entire Intelligence career which was to end nine months later), was delivered on 16 January 1961, four days before President Eisenhower turned over the Government to President Kennedy. In this speech, which was generally lost in the press during the Nation's preoccupation with Inauguration festivities, Dulles made almost no reference to CIA's recurring image, which he had publicly and privately cultivated so assiduously during his eight years, as an Intelligence production mechanism for seeking the truth, for freedom's sake, in the Government's policy-making and decision-and-action mechanisms. Instead, Dulles focussed on the U.S. propaganda warfare effort and on the need for improving informational action, as he addressed an audience of the elite of the publishing world as "my fellow printers." Although Dulles did not, of course, overtly acknowledge CIA's responsibilities for certain non-intelligence activities abroad (the fact of these CIA responsibilities was of course no secret, and surely was well known to publishing executives who were present), Dulles spoke of the common problem, shared by the Government and the public-opinion organs at home and abroad, in making better use of the "power of ideas," as he titled his speech. He described the new revolution in communication

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techniques, along with the other types of "revolution" which were currently being classified, in 1960-61, as the population explosion, the industrial and scientific revolutions, the nationalist revolutions, and now (a new category, coined by Adlai Stevenson in the political campaign just ended), the "revolution of rising and unsatisfied expectations" among the under developed and under privileged minorities emerging into majorities abroad and at home. In this propaganda war, Dulles dissected once again, for the publishers, the Communist image currently being cultivated by the Soviet and Chinese Communists among the 81 countries where their apparatus was installed. Included now, Dulles observed, was Cuba's Castro and Africa's Lumumba "and their ilk" who were serving as Khrushchev's "guided missiles of Communism rather than atomic bombs." He had almost nothing to say about U.S. Intelligence, except for a parenthetical remark or two (none the less significant for being in a low key), such as his assurance, added in his radio-broadcast version beamed out of New York, that "I'm glad to say," that we have learned more than Khrushchev even suspects about him and his plans, as he seeks to exploit these old and new revolutions. Dulles also inserted an apt comment, posing a contrast between CIA's extensive intelligence-reporting enterprise and the publishing industry's even more massive mass media. We publish too, he observed, but for the "smallest possible audience."

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Dulles' conclusions, on 16 January 1961, were a critique of Government policy rather than an appraisal of U.S. intelligence performance: the need for a better U.S. propaganda case abroad; the danger of under-rating, not now the economic strength of the enemy but the propaganda value to him of the Russian and Chinese "material progress" spread among the "newly emerging leaders (and) ... countries who feel they have not had their fair share of opportunity or of this world's goods." Over the objections of his public-affairs assistants, but with the concurrence of Secretary of State Herter's office*, Dulles ended this public version of his swan song with a call for better performance in the national-security image-producing field of foreign propaganda. We can and must "improve our performance," he declared. We must improve also our means of communication with the world at large, he added: "like nuclear weapons, ideas need an effective delivery system." In effect, it was both an appraisal of the Administration gone by and a challenge to the new Administration about to be inaugurated, spoken by one who was a member of both Administrations and one who, in his long public career, had served both as an intelligence expert and a policy activist.

This double image of CIA, serving both in the intelligence and "non" intelligence fields, as it was presented to the elite of America's publishing world, was surely not in contradiction

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STAT The State Department cleared Dulles' speech routinely, according to standing Presidential instructions, objecting not to Dulles remarks about policy but questioning what it called the "hot propagandist" tone of Dulles' analysis of the Communist propaganda apparatus. Secretary Herter's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Edwin M.J. Kretzmann, told Dulles' assistant ([redacted] acting for Colonel Stanley J. Grogan), on 13 January 1961: "What's wrong with this speech? It doesn't sound like Allen. He usually has such a feel for nuances. It sounds more like the other Allen (i.e. George Allen, head of USIA)--the speech of a hot propagandist." Kretzmann added that it wasn't that he objected to exposing, in or out of season, the fallacies of the Soviet system, but he wondered "what this all adds up to, by way of conclusion." There were other minor objections, too, by some of State's policy bureaus, concerned about the sensitivity of foreign governments, for example, to the "needlessly gratuitous" reference to ~~the~~ Lumumba; and a reference by Dulles to the "rising expectations" revolution in the Congo, where a story had circulated that as soon as they got their independence each family would promptly receive a new motor car as part of that independence. Both references were left to stand, in Dulles' speech as delivered. (Copies of notes from DCI/PA files.)

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to the appreciations that meanwhile had been expressed by the President and the NSC, when CIA's organization was used as an instrument of national policy. Nor was it at variance with the image of CIA in the Government's Legislative Branch, where the Congress was to continue to seek ways and means to exercise a measure of responsible political oversight over the development of the secret assets of the national security system.

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(continue to subchapter I-2)

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